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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAWN W. HORNE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 20187

W. REID HORNEf
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
May the trial court/ pursuant to settlement
of an action regarding division of marital property, and
in accordance with Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l (Supp.
1983), enter an order nunc pro tunc to the date the settlement
agreement was entered into in open court?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
(1) Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l (Supp. 1983):
Authority of Court. A court having jurisdiction
mayf upon its finding of good cause and giving of
such notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc
Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce,
legal separation or annulment of marriage.
(2)

Rules of Practice in the District Courts and

Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, Rule 4.5(b):
Stipulations. No orders, judgments or decrees
upon stipulation shall be signed or entered unless
such stipulation is in writing, signed by the
attorneys of record for the respective parties
and filed with the clerk, provided that the
stipulation may be made orally in open court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the entry by the trial
court nunc pro tunc of an order of distribution of property
incident to a previously granted divorce.
Course of Proceedings
This is a bifurcated divorce action in which the
parties were divorced on January 27, 1984, with division
of the parties' property reserved for later determination.
On June 20, 1984, following the first two days of the trial
of the property aspects of the case, the parties entered
into an oral property settlement on the record.

A dispute

arose over the tax conseguences of the agreement, and
on August 17, 1984, the District Court entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and its Order of Distribution
of Real and Personal Property, Payment of Debts, Support,
Attorney's Fees and Other Related Matters in which all
reference to taxability had been stricken.
Disposition in the Court Below
Over objection of Defendant, the court, on
August 17, 1984, entered its Order of Property Divison nunc
pro tunc to June 20, 1984.
Facts
Plaintiff, Don W. H o m e , and Defendant, W. Reid
H o m e , were married on January 17, 1970.
-2-

Plaintiff filed

for divorce on February 19, 1980. The District Court
ordered the divorce and property settlement issues in the
proceeding bifurcated.

On January 27, 1984, the parties

were divorced.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant brought substantial
premarital property into the marriage, and the parties
accumulated substantial property during the marriage.

Trial

of the division of property portion of the case began on
June 19, 1984, and was scheduled to run four days.

On the

second day of trial, after the Plaintiff had testified, the
parties reached a settlement agreement.

The settlement

agreement was read into the record that afternoon in the
presence of the parties, their counsel, and the court.
At one point, as the stipulation was being read into the
record of the court, the comment was made by Plaintiff's
counsel that "(The property) will be transferred to (Plaintiff)
as an exchange item to equalize the marital assets of the
parties in this matter."
hearing, page 3.)

(Transcript of June 20, 1984

After listening to the terms of the

stipulation, the court asked each party if they were in
agreement therewith.

Each party responded affirmatively,

whereupon the court stated "I will approve the
stipulation..."
The parties were later unable to agree on the tax
-3-

effects of the stipulation entered into on June 20, 1984.
Consequently, a hearing was held on August 8, 1984, wherein
the parties expressed their disagreement over the effect of
the stipulation.

Defendant's attorney argued that the

stipulation was intended to give Defendant tax benefits
under the rules stated in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S.
65 (1962) and subsequent law.

Plaintiff's attorney argued

that there was no such intent, and that Plaintiff would
never have entered into such an agreement under those
circumstances as it would involve negative tax consequences
to her.

The only evidence to support Defendant's version of

the stipulation was the statement of Plaintiff's counsel
that the property split was an "exchange item to equalize
marital assets".
The court held that the June 20, 1984 stipulation
was not intended to confer tax benefits on Defendant.
at 65.)

(Id.

The court stated its belief that Plaintiff's use of

the quoted language was not intended as a "term of art".
(Id. at 66.)

The court further noted that neither party

specifically discussed tax concerns such as stepped-up
basis, carry over basis, etc.

(JEcL at 67.)

Finally, the

court ruled that its order would be issued nunc pro tunc to
June 20, 1984, due, in part, to a recent change in the tax
-4-

law which would prejudice Plaintiff if the order were not
issued nunc pro tunc.

(Id. at 64.)

The nunc pro tunc order

was signed by the lower court on August 17, 1984.

Defendant

filed his notice of appeal on September 12, 1984.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The court of appeals should not overturn

the ruling of the lower court in discretionary matters
in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. The finding
of "good cause" to enter a nunc pro tunc order in divorce
matters is discretionary with the trial court.
2.

There was "good cause" for the court to enter

an order nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984.

This good cause

existed, among other things, in the court's finding that
the order signed August 17, 1984 had actually been entered
as of June 20, 1984. The findings of the trial court on this
point should not be disturbed unless no evidence exists to
support such findings.
3.

There was no exchange whereby Plaintiff

dropped charges against her attorney in return for entry of
the order nunc pro tunc.
ARGUMENT
I.
ROLE OF APPEALS COURTS GENERALLY IN
REGARDS TO DISCRETIONARY MATTERS
Before considering the issue in this case in
depth, it would be well to review the rules governing
appeals courts generally.
-5-

The rule is well settled that decisions of lower
courts which are discretionary will not be overturned unless
there has been a "clear abuse of discretion".

As was stated

in Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County,
555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976):
...Ordinarily, where the lower tribunal, acting
within the scope of its authority, has conducted a
hearing and arrived at a decision, the reviewing
court...will not interfere with matters of
discretion or upset the actions of the lower
tribunal, except upon a showing that the tribunal
acted in excess of its authority or in a manner
so clearly outside reason that its action must be
deemed capricious and arbitrary.
The issue which the court is called upon to decide
in this case—whether "good cause" existed to issue an
order nunc pro tunc—is one committed to the discretion of
the trial court.

(See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Stewart

in Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1984), wherein
he states that Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l "commits broad
discretion to trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders
in domestic relations matters.")
This court should therefore exercise extreme
caution before determining that the lower court acted "in a
manner so clearly outside reason that its action must be
deemed capricious and arbitrary."

(Peatross, supra.)

II.
THE COURT HAD GOOD CAUSE TO
ENTER ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC
A.

Meaning and Effect of Order "Nunc Pro Tunc".
-6-

The term "nunc pro tunc" means literally "now
for then". As the court in Preece, supra, discussed,
nunc pro tunc orders are generally issued "...to enter
now for then an order previously made."
299.)

(682 P.2d at

Regardless of the impact of Utah Code Annotated

§30-4a-l then, surely a court could not be held to have
exceeded discretionary bounds if it was merely entering
a nunc pro tunc order "to enter now for then an order
previously made."

A careful review of the record in

this case reveals that such was exactly the intent of
the lower court when it issued its nunc pro tunc order
on August 8, 1984.
B.

Oral Stipulations entered into in open court
are binding and valid when approved by the
Court.

Rule 4.5(b) of the Rules of Practice in the
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah
provides that "...orders, judgments or decrees upon stipulation
shall (not) be signed or entered unless such stipulation is
in writing. . .provided that the stipulation may be made orally
in open court."

The implication of the latter clause of

this rule is that a judgment or decree may be entered
based on a stipulation made orally in open court.
from other states supports this conclusion.

Case law

In Jones v.

Gladney, 339 So.2d 1019, 1021 (Alabama 1976), the court
stated that "...Agreements made in open court...are binding,
whether such agreements are oral or written."
-7-

And in

Sparaco v. Tenney, 399 A.2d 1261, 1262 (Conn. 1978), the
court held "A stipulated judgment made in open court is
not within the statute of frauds, and therefore it would
not be error for the trial court to act upon an oral
stipulation..."
C.

Parties entered into Oral Stipulation in open
court on June 20, 1984 and became bound
thereby on such date.

As this court is by now well aware, a hearing
was held in the chambers of the lower court on June 20,
1984.

At this time, attorneys for the respective parties

declared that a stipulation had been agreed to by the
parties which the parties desired to enter on the records
of the court.

The attorneys then orally declared the terms

of this stipulation, after which the court asked each of
the parties if they were in agreement with the terms of
the stipulation as stated.

When each party expressed

approval, the court stated "I will approve the stipulation
of settlement..."

At this moment in time, pursuant to

Rule 4.5(b) and the other authorities quoted above, an
order of the court was entered.

The transcript of the hearing held August 8, 1984
contains indication that Judge Rigtrup entered the
order nunc pro tunc because of his feeling that the
order had already been entered. At page 65 of the
transcript, in discussing his decision to enter the
order nunc pro tunc, Judge Rigtrup makes a comment to
the effect: "...if it (the order) had been timely
submitted..." It appears that Judge Rigtrup was
expressing the opinion that entry of the order nunc pro
tunc was proper in that he would have signed the order
on June 20, 1984, or any time prior to July 18, 1984,
if it had been submitted.
-8-

When the court determined on August 8, 1984 to enter its
order nunc pro tunc to June 20, it was merely correcting the
record to make it speak the truth.

This is the traditional

purpose of a nunc pro tunc order, and it was therefore
clearly not error for such nunc pro tunc order to be entered.
Ill
COURTS FINDING AS TO PARTIES INTENT ON JUNE 20,
1984 WAS SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, AND IS NOT
REVERSIBLE
The decision rendered by this court on or about
May 18, 1987 appears to have taken into account, to some
extent, the above argument.

At page 8 of the opinion,

it is stated "If the court had entered its order nunc pro
tunc to give effect to the parties1 expressed intentions
prior to the change in the tax laws, good cause no doubt
would exist."

However, this court then ruled that such

was not the intent of the trial court.

This court noted

the language contained in the agreement reached between
the parties on June 20, which stated "(The property) will
be transferred to (Plaintiff) as an exchange item to
equalize the marital assets of the parties in this matter."
(Id.)

This court concluded that such language must be

interpreted to be "tax language".

This conclusion is in

direct conflict with that reached by the trial court, which
considered the same issue, and held that it should not be
construed as "tax language".

(Transcript of August 8, 1984

-9-

Hearing, Page 66-67.)
At this point, it is well to remember that the
Court of Appeals should not substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court when the conclusion reached by the
trial court has support in the evidence.

As the Supreme

Court stated in Nupetco Associates v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877,
881, 883 (Utah 1983):
On review, this court is obliged to view the
evidence and all inferences that may be drawn
therefrom in a light most supportive of the
findings of the trier of fact. The findings and
judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed
when they are based on substantial, competent,
admissible evidence ...
While it is true that in eguity cases, this
court may review guestions of both law and fact,
we are not bound to substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court, and because of its
advantaged position, we give considerable deference
to its finding and judgment.
Also, in Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d
512, 514 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court stated:
The findings and conclusions of the District
Court must be affirmed unless there is no reasonable
basis in the evidence to support them. Further,
the evidences and all inferences that fairly and
reasonably might be drawn therefrom must be viewed
in a light most favorable to the judgment entered...
This court will not substitute its view of the
evidence for that of the District Court.
With the above in mind, the question then becomes,
"Was there any evidence to support the trial court's determination that the stipulation of June 20, 1984 did not
involve tax considerations?"

The answer to this question is
-10-

in the affirmative.
The record reveals that the trial court was
reminded of the statement quoted above to the effect
that there was to be a property division to equalize marital
assets.

The trial court responded "I don't think that

was intended as a term of art, particularly."
of August 8, 1984 hearing, page 66.)

(Transcript

Later on, the lower

court specifically states "...there was no discussion
on the record with regard to basis or stepped-up basis or
any specific discussions on the record with respect to tax
consequences."

(_Id_. at 67.)

In essence, the lower court was stating: "I was
there at the June 20 hearing.
of that hearing.

I have reviewed the transcript

I have listened to the arguments of respective

counsel regarding the intent of the parties in entering
into the stipulation on June 20.

I find that the evidence

indicates the parties did not intend that Defendant have
any Davis-type benefit when the stipulation was entered
into.

Had they had such intent, they would have been more

specific."

This is a reasonable conclusion, and one warranted

by the evidence.

The conclusion should therefore not be

disturbed on appeal.

-11-

IV.
THERE WAS NO EXCHANGE OF NUNC PRO
TUNC ORDER FOR DISMISSAL OF MISCONDUCT CHARGES
The appellate court in its decision alludes to the
possibility that Judge Rigtrup's nunc pro tunc order was
made, in part, because of Plaintiff dropping her claim of
counsel for alleged misconduct.

After careful review

of the entire record, respondent's counsel finds nothing
in the record that would indicate that there was any exchange
of the nature alleged.
were dropped*

Admittedly, misconduct charges

However, this was in accordance with the

arguments presented at the August 8, 1984 hearing to the
effect that the whole matter had already been resolved as of
June 20, 1984, and that the misconduct charges were therefore
unwarranted and in violation of statute.

(Transcript of

August 8, 1984 hearing, pages 4-5.)
Even if there was such an exchange, Judge Rigtrup
still had good cause for entering the order nunc pro tunc in
accordance with the arguments presented above.

The reliance

on this "exchange" theory was therefore harmless error
which does not justify reversal of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The lower court entered an order nunc pro tunc
to June 20, 1984, on the grounds that such was the date the
parties stipulated to the order, and that the order should
be therefore effective as of that date.
-12-

The court further

found that the stipulation entered into on June 20, 1984 did
not confer Davis-type benefits on Defendant.

The Court of

Appeals should not overturn these findings and conclusions
unless there is no evidence in the record which would
support such determinations.

Since the record supports the

lower court's statement that neither party discussed Davistype benefits on June 20, 1984, the lower court was justified
in its conclusion that such consequences were not a part of
the June 20 stipulation.

Such finding should not therefore

be overturned.
The appeals court's previous comments to the
effect that Plaintiff dropped misconduct charges against her
attorney in exchange for the nunc pro tunc order are simply
not supported by a fair reading of the record.

Furthermore,

such issue is irrelevant in that the court had other "good
cause" to enter the order nunc pro tunc.
Respectfully submitted this

ay of June, 1987.

BRAUNBERGER} POULSEN^BOUD, P.C.

Robert J\ Pou^en
David A. Wildfe
Bradley R. Jones

6/7/87,B6-18,le

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
were mailed, postage prepaid, on the IS day of June, 1987,
to the following:
RICHARD K. CRANDALL
RODNEY R. PARKER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Appellant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

6/7/87,B23,le

